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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Juan Anthony Jimenez appeals from the judgment entered upon the
district court's order summarily dismissing his successive petition for postconviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Underlying Criminal and Initial PostConviction Proceedings
The facts of the underlying criminal case and initial post-conviction
proceedings are as set forth in the Respondent's brief filed in Jimenez's prior
appeal, State v. Jimenez, S.Ct. Docket No. 40109, 1 as follows:
In the underlying criminal case, the state charged Jimenez
with aggravated battery in relation to the September 9, 2007
stabbing of Jay Voshall. ([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.424-25.) The
evidence at trial showed Jimenez and Ruben Nungary got into a
physical confrontation with Mr. Voshall inside a Maverick
convenience store. (Trial Tr., 121 p.144, L.7 - p.148, L.22, p.164,
Ls.10-25, p.178, L.10 - p.180, L.11, p.197, L.20 - p.202, L.17,
p.269, L.21 - p.270, L.13, p.442, L.18 - p.449, L.3.) Nungary and

1

The district court took judicial notice of the appellate briefing filed in Jimenez's
prior appeal, Docket No. 40109, as well as a number of documents contained in
the clerk's record in that case. (R., pp.165-68.) Contemporaneously with the
filing of this brief, the state is filing a motion requesting the Idaho Supreme Court
to also take judicial notice of the clerk's record and appellate briefs in Docket No.
40109.
The appellate proceedings in Docket No. 40109 are presently
suspended and presumably will remain suspended until this appeal is at issue, at
which time the Idaho Court of Appeals has indicated Jimenez may move to
consolidate the two cases for purposes of oral argument. (See #40109 Order,
dated January 31, 2014.)
2

The district court in Docket No. 40109 took judicial notice of a number of
documents from the underlying criminal case, including the transcript of
Jimenez's criminal trial (Trial Tr.). (See #40109 R., Vol. 3, pp.437-38.) That
transcript is included in Volume 2 of the Docket No. 40109 clerk's record at
pp. 116-273.

1

Mr. Voshall got into a fistfight. (Trial Tr., p.146, L.23 - p.147, L.9,
p.199, L.10 - p.201, L.5, p.264, Ls.33-12, p.269, Ls.12-25, p.446l
L.23 - p.447, L.12.) Then, according to witness accountsP
Jimenez shoved Mr. Voshall in the stomach area with one hand,
causing Mr. Voshall to double-over. (Trial Tr., p.147, L.16 - p.148,
L.6, p.158, Ls.10-17, p.183, L.17- p.184, L.13, p.201, L.8 - p.202,
L.9, p.470, L.25 - p.471, L.6; see also Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.4-9
(witness testifying that store surveillance video showed Jimenez
"lean in towards" Mr. Voshall, "almost with one arm like this towards
him," "[a]lmost like he was giving him a one-arm hug.").) Jimenez
and Nungary then exited the store. (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.7-13,
p.187, L.9-p.189, L.19, p.201, Ls.8-16, p.270, Ls.1-13.)
As soon as Jimenez and Nungary left the store, Mr. Voshall
lifted up his shirt and told onlookers he had been "stabbed" or
"shanked." (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.10-16, p.180, Ls.8-11.) He was
bleeding from his abdomen, and there was blood on the floor.
(Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.17-19, p.155, Ls.6-9, p.181, Ls.7-9, p.182,
Ls.8-11, p.202, Ls.12-21, p.253, L.14 - p.254, L.2.) Paramedics
responded to the scene and transported Mr. Voshall to the hospital
for treatment of a one- to one-and-a-half-inch, "straight edged,"
"slightly gaping" epigastric wound. (Trial Tr., p.275, L.13 - p.276,
L.20, p.281, L.19 - p.282, L.1, p.283, L.17 - p.284, L.2.)
In the meantime, police located Jimenez and Nungary and
placed them under arrest. (Trial Tr., p.288, L.1 - p.291, L.23,
p.294, Ls.2-7, p.302, L.20 - p.304, L.10, p.305, L.14 - p.306, L.7.)
Jimenez had red stains on the tops of his shoes, which later tested
positive for human blood. (Trial Tr., p.307, L.22 - p.308, L.17,
p.343, L.22 - p.344, L.10, p.347, L.1 - p.362, L.13, p.423, L.1 p.426, L.7.) Police also canvassed the route Jimenez and Nungary
took after leaving the convenience store and found along that route
a knife with red stains on the blade (Trial Tr., p.328, L.3 - p.329,
L.12, p.362, L.16 - p.367, L.24, p.369, L.15 - p.376, L.22); those
stains also tested positive for human blood (Trial Tr., p.417, L.15 p.419, L.6).
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Jimenez guilty of
aggravated battery. ([#40109] R., Vol. 2, p.291.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with nine years fixed.
([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.435-36.)
Jimenez's conviction and
sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Jimenez, Docket No.

3

Mr. Voshall did not appear as a witness at Jimenez's trial. (See #40109 R.,
Vol. 2, pp.120-21.)

2

35807, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 305 (Idaho App. Jan. 8,
2010).

Jimenez filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction
relief and supporting materials. ([#40109] R., Vol. 1, pp.4-84.)
With the assistance of appointed counsel, he filed an amended
petition and a supporting affidavit. ([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.360-68.)
Relevant to this appeal, the amended petition alleged trial counsel
was ineffective for: (1) "Refus[ing] to consider DNA test on shoes
when asked by client" (R., Vol. 3, p.362, 11 (9)(b)(viii)); (2) failing to
"object to, or attempt in any way to exclude, blood test evidence"
(id., 11 (9)(c)(iii)); (3) failing to "adequately show the DVDNideo
evidence to client before trial" and otherwise failing to "prepare
client for cross-examination" (id., 1111 (9)(b)(iii) and (9)(c)(ii)); and (4)
failing to "request a lesser-included instruction or verdict form for
Simple Battery" (id., 11 (9)(c)(iv)). Jimenez also filed a motion and
affidavit seeking DNA testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes and
Mr. Voshall's shirt, swabs of which Jimenez alleged were still in the
state's possession. ([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.384-89.)
The state answered the amended petition and also filed an
objection to Jimenez's motion for DNA testing. ([#40109] R., Vol.
3, pp.376-80, 390-91.) Following a hearing, the district court
denied the motion for DNA testing, concluding the request did not
meet the specific requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(b), (c). ([#40109]
R., Vol. 3, pp.392-96; see also 9/19/11 Tr., pp.1-15.) The state
thereafter moved to dismiss the amended petition in its entirety.
([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.400-36.) Following a hearing, the district
court granted the state's motion and entered an order of dismissal.
([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.447-86; see also [#40109] 12/9/11 Tr.,
pp.5-25.) Jimenez timely appealed. ([#40109] R., Vol. 3, pp.48891.)

Statement of Facts and Course of the Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings
On May 4, 2013, while his appeal from the dismissal of his initial postconviction petition was still pending, Jimenez filed a pro se successive petition
for post-conviction relief and supporting materials.

(R., pp.3-64.)

The district

court appointed counsel, who thereafter filed an amended successive petition

3

and supporting affidavits. (R., pp.73-75, 94-114.) As he had in his original postconviction petition (in Docket No. 40109), Jimenez alleged in his amended
successive post-conviction petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request DNA testing of the blood stains on Jimenez's shoes and for failing to
investigate Xavier Machuca as a witness. (R., pp.95-97.)

He also alleged trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of his shoes into
evidence at trial.

(R., pp.97-98.)

Jimenez asserted he was entitled to file a

successive petition because the claims therein were either inadequately raised
or not raised at all in his first post-conviction petition due to ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel. (R., pp.115-19.)
The state objected to the amended successive petition and moved to
dismiss it. (R., pp.120-33, 136-49.) After a hearing, the district court granted the
state's motion and dismissed the amended successive petition on the alternative
bases that the claims therein were untimely, that Jimenez had not established a
sufficient reason for bringing the claims in a successive petition, and that
Jimenez failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an
evidentiary hearing on any of his claims.

(R., pp.169-85.)

appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.186-90, 196-98.)

4

Jimenez timely

ISSUES
Jimenez states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err in concluding that the successive
petition was not filed within a reasonable time?
2.
Should this case be remanded so that Mr. Jimenez has the
opportunity to allege that he has sufficient reason to file a
successive petition in light of Murphy?
3.
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr.
Jimenez's successive petition for post-conviction relief?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Jimenez failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his untimely and
improper successive post-conviction petition?

5

ARGUMENT
Jimenez Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Untimely
And Improper Successive Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed Jimenez's successive post-conviction petition

on three alternative bases: (1) the petition was untimely; (2) Jimenez did not
establish a sufficient reason for overcoming the successive petition bar of I.C. §
19-4908; and (3) Jimenez failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any of his claims.

(R., pp.169-85.)

Contrary to Jimenez's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the
applicable law supports the district court's rulings.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986). The Court also freely reviews the district court's application of
the statute of limitation to a post-conviction petition.

Schwartz v. State, 145

Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Freeman v. State, 122
Idaho 627,628,836 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992)).

6

C.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Jimenez's Successive Petition As
Untimely
A post-conviction proceeding must be commenced by filing a petition "any

time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the
determination of an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an
appeal, whichever is later."

I.C. § 19-4902(a).

In the case of successive

petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid application of I.C. §
19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims which simply are not
known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process
issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009)
(quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)).
Thus, previously unknown claims are not time-barred if brought within a
reasonable time of when they were known or should have been known.
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070.
"In determining what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition,
[the appellate court] will simply consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been
done in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875; see
also Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070.
ineffective assistance

of counsel

claims

"should

be

Generally, however,
reasonably known

immediately upon the completion of the trial." Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 253, 220
P.3d at 1072. Moreover, the timeliness of a petition is measured "from the date
of notice, not from the date a petitioner assembles a complete cache of
evidence." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875.

7

Jimenez filed his successive petition one year after the district court
dismissed his original petition and more than three years after the final
determination of his direct appeal in the criminal case. (Compare R., p.3 with
#40109 R., p.451 and State v. Jimenez, Docket No. 35807, 2010 Unpublished
Opinion No. 305 (Idaho App. Jan. 8, 2010).) The successive petition alleged trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to request DNA testing of the blood stains on
Jimenez's shoes, failing to investigate Xavier Machuca as a witness, and failing
to object on chain of custody grounds to the admission of Jimenez's shoes into
evidence.

(R., pp.3-64, 91-114.)

The district court correctly dismissed these

claims as untimely because, under Idaho law, Jimenez is presumed to have had
notice of these ineffective assistance of claims "immediately upon completion of
the trial."

Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 253, 220 P .3d at 1072.

Even if the

presumption does not apply, the claims were properly dismissed as untimely
because the record shows Jimenez had actual notice of the claims no later than
November 2010, when he filed his initial post-conviction petition.
As found by the district court, Jimenez raised the first two claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain DNA testing and failing to
investigate Machuca as a witness - in his original post-conviction petition filed
November 8, 2010.

(R., p.175; see also #40109 R., Vol. 3, pp.362, 366.)

Although Jimenez did not yet have the DNA test results that excluded the victim
as the source of blood on his shoes when he filed his original post-conviction
petition (see R., pp.107-10 (FBI Laboratory DNA report dated February 1,
2013)), Jimenez clearly did not need those results in order to raise the claim that

8

counsel was ineffective for not having the shoes tested before trial. 4 Jimenez
supported his original post-conviction petition with affidavits in which he averred
that (1) he told his attorney the blood on his shoes did not belong to the victim
but instead belonged to Machuca, an individual Jimenez claimed to have been in
a fight with on the same day the victim was stabbed, (2) despite this information,
trial counsel never contacted Machuca about the blood evidence, and (3) trial
counsel "refused [Jimenez's] request to seek DNA tests on the blood evidence."
(#40109 R., Vol. 1, pp.13-14; #40109 R., Vol. 3, p.366.) The petition was also
accompanied by Machuca's statement, albeit unsworn, corroborating Jimenez's
assertions that he and Jimenez fought before the charged stabbing incident, that
the blood on Jimenez's shoes was his, and that Jimenez's trial counsel never
contacted him before trial. (#40109 R., Vol. 1, pp.52-53.) These factual claims,
made in conjunction with Jimenez's original post-conviction petition, clearly
demonstrate Jimenez had actual notice of his current post-conviction claims at or
very near the time of trial.

Although subsequent DNA testing corroborated

Jimenez's (and Machuca's) assertions that the blood on Jimenez's shoes did not
belong to the victim, such was merely additional evidence supporting Jimenez's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; that Jimenez had not yet assembled
that complete cache of evidence before filing his original post-conviction petition
did not toll the limitation period for bringing those claims of which he clearly had
actual notice.

Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P .3d at 875.

4

The district

Nor was the report helpful because, although it excluded the victim as the
source of blood on Jimenez's shoes, it identified the victim as the source of
blood on Jimenez's pants and on the knife. (R., pp.107-10.)
9

court thus correctly dismissed Jimenez's first two ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, reasserted in his successive post-conviction petition more than
three years after the conclusion of the criminal case, as untimely.
The district court likewise correctly dismissed Jimenez's third ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on the basis that it was not timely.

Jimenez alleged

in his successive petition that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a "chain
of evidence and/or foundation" objection to the admission of his shoes into
evidence at trial, thereby preventing Jimenez from raising "the issue of chain of
custody on his appeal."

(R., p.97.)

Jimenez did not include this claim in his

original post-conviction petition; however, that petition was accompanied by a
letter, dated December 15, 2009, in which the Office of the State Appellate
Public Defender explained to Jimenez that "the chain of custody of the shoes
could not be raised in direct appeal because it wasn't addressed at the trial
court." (R., p.176.) Thus, as found by the district court, "this claim was known to
[Jimenez] on December 15, 2009, well in advance of the time of filing his first
petition." (R., p.177 (emphasis added).) Jimenez provided no explanation why

he failed to raise this ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his first petition,
nor is any explanation apparent from the record. Because Jimenez had actual
notice of the basis of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim no later than
December 2009, his failure to bring the claim until May 2013 was simply not
reasonable. The district court correctly dismissed the claim as untimely.
In arguing the district court erred in dismissing the claims in his
successive petition as untimely, Jimenez contends the "reasonable time" to bring

10

a successive petition does not begin until the final determination of the original
post-conviction proceedings.
frivolous.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-8.)

This argument is

The Idaho Supreme Court made clear in Charboneau, supra, that,

pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902, the time for bringing a post-conviction petition
commences upon the final determination of the criminal case in which the
conviction arose. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. The court
made equally clear that there is no fixed limitation period for bringing a
successive petition.

&

at 904-05, 174 P.3d at 874-75. Rather, because I.C. §

19-4908 contemplates the filing of successive petitions to raise claims that, for
sufficient reason, were either not asserted or were inadequately asserted in an
initial application, due process requires that there be a reasonable time within
which such claims [may be] asserted in a successive post-conviction petition,

once those claims are known."

&

at 905, 174 P.3d at 875 (emphasis added).

Because, as set forth above, Jimenez had actual notice of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims no later than November 2010, he has failed to
show error in the district court's determination that those claims, reasserted or
asserted for the first time in his May 2013 successive post-conviction petition,
were not filed within a reasonable time.

The district court correctly dismissed

Jimenez's successive petition as untimely.

D.

The District Court Correctly Dismissed Jimenez's Successive Petition
Because Jimenez Failed To Allege A Sufficient Reason For Overcoming
The Successive Petition Bar Of I.C. § 19-4908
Idaho law provides that grounds "finally adjudicated or not ... raised" in an

initial or amended petition for post-conviction relief generally "may not be the

11

basis for a subsequent application." I.C. § 19-4908. Only where the petitioner
can show "sufficient reason" why claims were "not asserted" or "inadequately
presented in the original" case may he pursue a successive petition.

!st;

Griffin

v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation
omitted).

Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not constitute

"sufficient reason" for filing a successive petition.

Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho

389, 391, 327 P.3d 365, 367 (2014).
It is undisputed that the current petition is successive. (R., p.171.) It is
also undisputed that, below, Jimenez relied exclusively upon assertions of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as his "sufficient reason" for
filing a successive petition. (R., pp.175-80.) Because ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel is not a basis for avoiding application of the statutory bar
on successive petitions, the district court properly dismissed the petition as
successive.
On appeal, Jimenez acknowledges Murphy but argues that, because the
proceedings on his successive petition were concluded before Murphy was
decided, the case should be remanded to allow him the opportunity to show his
successive petition was justified by a "sufficient reason" other than ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) There are
at least two reasons why this Court should decline Jimenez's invitation for a
remand.
First, granting such a request would be inconsistent with the holding of
Murphy itself. Relying on established precedent that held ineffective assistance

12

of post-conviction counsel may constitute a sufficient reason to overcome the
successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908, Murphy, like Jimenez, alleged
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as the basis for bringing a
successive petition for post-conviction relief. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 391-92, 327
P.3d at 367-68.

The district court summarily dismissed the petition, and the

Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, but on grounds never considered or decided by
the lower court. Specifically, the Court overruled the prior precedent on which
Murphy had relied and held that, because there is no statutory or constitutional
right to counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, "ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under I. C. § 19-4908 for allowing a
successive petition."

Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371.

Because

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel was the only justification
Murphy offered for bringing a successive petition, the Idaho Supreme Court held
the petition was barred by I.C. § 19-4908.

19.:.

Notably, although Murphy never

had notice her successive petition could be dismissed on that ground, the Court
did not remand the case to allow Murphy to attempt to justify the successive
petition with some other "sufficient reason."

J.9.:.; accord Lopez v. State, 157

Idaho 795, 339 P.3d 1199 (Ct. App. 2014); Parvin v. State, 157 Idaho 518, 337
P.3d 677 (Ct. App. 2014).
The procedural posture of this case is indistinguishable from Murphy.
Jimenez alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as the sole
basis for overcoming the successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908.

Because

ineffective assistance of counsel is no longer a "sufficient reason" for bringing a

13

successive petition, this Court is bound by Murphy to affirm the summary
dismissal of Jimenez's successive post-conviction petition on this basis.
In addition to being inconsistent with the holding a Murphy, remanding this
case to allow Jimenez to attempt to justify his successive petition on some
ground other than ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel would also be
inappropriate because doing so would effectively be giving Jimenez a third
opportunity to avoid the summary dismissal of his petition. After Jimenez filed
his amended petition and supporting materials, the state moved to dismiss the
petition on several alternative bases, including that Jimenez's claims of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel were conclusory and failed to
demonstrate a sufficient reason for overcoming the successive petition bar of
I.C. § 19-4908 (R., pp.141-48.) Jimenez responded to the state's motion but
only cursorily addressed the state's argument regarding the viability of his
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claims to establish a sufficient
reason for bringing the successive petition, and he never so much as hinted that
there existed any alternative "sufficient reason" why the successive petition was
proper.

(R., pp.154-58.)

Because Jimenez has already been given two

opportunities - once in his amended petition and once in response to the state's
motion for summary disposition - to proffer whatever sufficient reason(s) he
believed existed to justify the filing of his successive petition, his request for a
third bite at the proverbial apple should be denied. Consistent with Murphy, the
district court's order summarily dismissing Jimenez's successive petition must be
affirmed.

14

E.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Jimenez Failed To Present A
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him To An Evidentiary Hearing
On Any Of His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
Even assuming Jimenez's petition was not untimely and prohibited by the

successive petition bar of I.C. § 19-4908, the district court nevertheless correctly
dismissed the petition on the alternative basis that Jimenez failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
post-conviction petitioner must satisfy the two prong test set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The
petitioner must demonstrate: 1) that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have
been different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

A reviewing court evaluates

counsel's performance at the time of the alleged error, not in hindsight, and
presumes that "trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics were based on
sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127,
146-47 (1997).

Counsel's strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-

guessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of
ineffective counsel unless the UPCPA petitioner has shown that the decision
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other
shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924,
877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 430-31, 788
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P .2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990). "The constitutional requirement for effective
assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who can
dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have been tried
better." Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992).
In dismissing Jimenez's petition, the district court thoroughly evaluated all
of Jimenez's claims and supporting evidence and correctly determined, based
upon the applicable legal standards and underlying criminal and initial postconviction records, that Jimenez failed to set forth adequate facts to raise a
genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any of his
ineffective assistance of claims. (See R., pp.172-83.) The state adopts as its
argument on appeal the reasoning set forth in the district court's order of
summary dismissal, as well as that articulated by the state in its Respondent's
brief filed in Jimenez's prior appeal (Docket No. 40109). For this Court's
convenience, copies of the district court's order and the relevant portions of the
Respondent's brief filed in Docket No. 40109 are appended to this brief. (See
Appendices A and B.)

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
summary dismissal of Jimenez's successive post-conviction petition.
DATED this 1ih day of February 2015.
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
R BULL, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
JUAN ANTHONY JIMENEZ,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV13-4753

vs.

ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING
OBJECTION TO SUCCESSIVE
PETITION AND GRANTING
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL

STA TE OF IDAl:iO,
Defendants.

Petitioner was convicted of Aggravated Battery for the stabbing of Jay Voshall in
2008. Petitioner appealed questioning whether the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a sentence of fifteen years, with nine years fixed. The sentence was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals in an Unpublished Opinion, 2010 WL 9585462.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed his first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Canyon
County Case CV-2010-11936 in 2010. An Amended Petition was subsequently filed. In
the Amended Petition, Petitioner alleged:
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1. Evidence of material fact existed which were not presented to the jury,
specifically;
a. That a witness named Xavier Machuca would testify that the blood found
on the Petitioner's shoes came from Machuca during a fight that the two
men had earlier on the same date as the offense;
b. That the shoes are still available in the custody of law enforcement, Xavier
Machuca is available, and the DNA test can still be done in connection
with this Petitioner.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the trial court level, specifically:
a. Inadequate preparation;
b. Ignorance;
c. Failure to request a contfnuance to prepare for trial after the court denied
his motion to withdraw;
d. Failure to competently represent him at trial.
Petitioner alleged that trial counsel did not contact or interview any potential
defense witnesses (including Xavier Machuca), and that trial counsel did not object to
the admission of the expert testimony on the blood test.

In that post-conviction case,

the district court summarily dismissed the petition on different grounds.

The Court

found that although Machuca provided what purported to be an Affidavit, because the
affidavit did not contain the necessary elements to make it a legal document, it did not
contain admissible evidence and therefore, could not be considered. As a result, the
Court found the Petition failed to adequately support the claim. As to the DNA issue, the
district court held that even if the DNA testing had been completed and the blood on the
ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING OBJECTION TO SUCCESSIVE PETITION
AND GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL PAGE-2

0001.'70

•

•

shoes did not belong to the victim, it did not establish more probably than not that the
Petitioner was not the perpetrator pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902(c), and therefore, did not
allow the testing. 1 The Court summarily dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed the
dismissal to the Idaho Appellate Courts and Oral Argument is set for February 4, 2014.
At issue in the appeal are: 1. whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Jimenez's
motion for DNA testing, and 2. Whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing
the Petition.

As it relates to the DNA testing, the issue is whether the district court

erroneously required Petitioner to meet the standards of I.C. § 19-4902(b) where the
test was requested to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to a
timely-fifed petition under I. C. § 19-4902(a).
In this action, the Petitioner has filed a successive petition for post-conviction
relief and claims:
1. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to request DNA testing of the
blood stains on Petitioner's shoes at the time of the offense;
2. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate Xavier Machuca
as a witness;
3. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the admission of
Petitioner's shoes into evidence at the trial;
The State has filed a motion objecting to the filing of the successive petition on
the grounds that the claims could have or were raised in the initial petition filed in CV-

It should be noted that in a subsequent federal case, Petitioner had tested of several
DNA samples from the crime scene. The test results indicated the blood on Petitioner's
shoes did not belong to Mr. Voshall. However, testing did disclose that Mr. Voshall's
blood was located on two different locations on Petitioner's pants and on the knife found
near the store where the stabbing occurred.
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2010-11936 and therefore, have been waived pursuant to !.C. § 19-4908, are barred by
res judicata and are not timely filed.

The state has also filed a Motion for Summary

Dismissal.
The standards for post-conviction are clearly established:
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,
495, 36 P .3d 1278, 1282 (2001 ). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the
applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of
evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction
relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). Unlike
the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application for postconviction relief must contain more than "a short and plain statement of
the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1}. Rather,
an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to
facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The
application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting
its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not
included. Id.
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if
the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. I .C. §
19-4906(b), (c). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine
whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally
construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002),
citing LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430
(Ct.App.1997). A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted
allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions.
Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). When the
alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial
court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975).
Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of
relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law. Id.

Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007).
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The Charboneau Court also addressed timeliness of successive petitions:
While I.C. § 19-4908 does not mention whether successive petitions must
be filed within the one year time limitation, the statute clearly contemplates
there may be circumstances under which a successive petition may be
filed if the trial court finds a claim "for sufficient reason was not asserted or
was inadequately raised" in the original petition. Moreover, as
acknowledged by the State, there may be claims which simply are not
known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due
process issues.
Id. at 904, 174 P.3d at 874.

Idaho Code § 19-4908 precludes raising any grounds for relief that could have been
raised in the initial petition if the claims
were known or should have been known to the petitioner at the time of the
earlier petition unless the petitioner shows "sufficient reason" why the
claim was not asserted in the earlier case. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932,
933-34, 801 P.2d 1283, 1284-85 (1990); Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho
591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981); Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 947, 908 P.2d
1252, 1254 (Ct.App.1995).
Casper v. State, 36042, 2010 WL 9585652 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2010). Notably,

In Palmer, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that where certain
allegations were presented in an original petition but then were omitted by
Palmer's court-appointed attorney without Palmer's knowledge or consent,
he would not be barred from raising these issues in a successive petition.
Palmer, 102 Idaho at 595-96, 635 P.2d at 959-60.
Id. (emphasis in original). Claims not fully litigated in the initial petition are not barred

based on res judicata unless there was a final adjudication as to the claim. Id., citing
Palmer, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955.

While there is no constitutionally protected right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel and therefore does not give rise to a valid post-conviction claim,
"ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may, however, provide sufficient
reason for permitting newly-asserted allegations or allegations inadequately raised in
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the initial petition to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction petition." Ura-Lopez v.
State, 39967, 2013 WL 6009148 (Idaho Ct. App. July 25, 2013), citing

Schwartz v.

State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct.App.2008), Palmer v. Dermitt, 102

Idaho 591, 596, 635 P .2d 955, 960 (1981 ); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798,
992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct.App.1999).
In this case, Petitioner conceded that the first two claims - the failure to test the
DNA and the failure to investigate Xavier Machuca were raised in the 2010 petition for
post-conviction relief but argues that those issues were inadequately raised in that
petition.

Petitioner asserts that although his third claim was not raised in the initial

petition, he did not waive the presentation of the issue and the failure to raise the issue
in the 201 0 petition necessarily demonstrates the issue was not fully and fairly Htigated
and therefore, can be raised in a successive petition.
The State argues that all claims are barred by LC. § 19-4908, that the claim
involving the DNA was fully and fairly litigated in the first petition and is therefore barred
by res judicata. While the State concedes that the claim involving Xavier Machuca was
not finally adjudicated and therefore, is not barred by res judicata, it argues the claim is
not timely filed. As to the third claim, the State asserts that Petitioner has failed to make
a prima facie showing explaining why the claim was not raised in the first petition
because the absence of the issue does not necessarily imply ineffective assistance of
prior post-conviction such that the issue can be raised in the successive petition.
Instead, the State argues the Petitioner must establish by admissible evidence, that he
requested the issue be asserted in the first petition but that post-conviction counsel
declined to pursue the issue.
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The first two claims - DNA testing and the Machuca affidavit - were raised in the
first petition. Thus, Petitioner knew about the claims at the time he filed the first petition
on November 8, 2010. The Court of Appeals held in Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186
(Ct. App. 2008), that filing a successive petition 11 months after the denial of a motion
to extend the filing time for the petition was unreasonable, where Schwartz had
information that
included her criminal case number, several facts pertinent to her case,
and potential claims for post-conviction relief. It is therefore clear that
Schwartz possessed adequate information to file an application for postconviction relief. When Schwartz finally mailed her application, it included
coherent argument in support of her claim that post-conviction counsel's
ineffective assistance justified a tolling of the limitation period, as well as
citation to applicable sections of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act and case law. Schwartz has thus demonstrated that she had the
capacity and resources necessary to assert the claim of ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel without the assistance of an
attorney.
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 191, 177 P.3d 400, 405 (Ct. App. 2008).

In this case, looking both at the initial petition filed in 2010 and at the petition in
2013, it is clear that Petitioner possessed adequate information to file the successive
petition sooner than May 14, 2013. Petitioner's 2010 Petition contained:
1. A four-page petition;
2. A 42-page affidavit of facts in support of the petition, containing excerpts from
cases, citation to the triaf transcript and citation to exhibits. The affidavit also
contaln·s argument, supported by authority, that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to test the blood on his shoes, failing to argue that the blood came
from a fight with Xavier Machuca, and failing to contact Machuca;
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3. The purported affidavit from Mr. Machuca, that contains, substantively, the
identical information contained in the affidavit filed in the 2013 petition;
4. An Affidavit of Petitioner;
5. Photos of the crime scene;
6. Jury Instructions 1-22.
His successive petition filed ln 2013 consists of:
1. A six-page, coherently written petition;
2. A copy of the Register of Actions from the first post-conviction petition;
3. A letter Petitioner wrote to the trial court in his criminal case prior to
sentencing where he outlines the claims regarding the DNA and the claim that
hi.s attorney did not talk to other witnesses;
4. A letter dated July 18, 2008, where he again identifies the DNA claim, that he
told his attorney the evidence and that he didn't get a fair opportunity to cross
examine the victim;
5. A letter from the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender dated
December 15, 2009, specifically explaining that the chain of custody of the
shoes could not be raised in direct appeal because it wasn't addressed at the
trial court;
6. A selection of pages of the trial transcript;
7. A copy of Jury Instructions 2 and 3;
8. A copy of the Motion to Withdraw as counsel, filed February 22, 2008;
9. District Court minutes from hearings held February 22, 2008, March 6, 2008
and April 10, 2008.
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Additionally, in 2013, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition, clarifying the issues
on appeal and attaching:
1. The affidavit of Xavier Machuca;
2. The affidavit of J.D. Merris;
3. The results of the DNA test of blood samples;
4. The affidavit of the Petitioner.
The DNA testing was denied on September 19, 2011, which is the time Petitioner
learned of the claim. Petitioner has provided no explanation as to why it took 20 months
to renew the claim in the successive petition.
Similarly, Petitioner was on notice that there were problems with the Machuca
affidavit no later than May 18, 2012, when the Petition was summarily dismissed.
Petition has provided no explanation why it took him 11 months and 26 days to file
essentially, an identical claim regarding the Machuca affidavit. Finally, as to the third
claim, this claim was known to Petitioner on December 15, 2009, well in advance of the
time of filing his first petition. Petitioner provides no explanation why he failed to raise
this in his initial petition, given the detail with which he raised other claims. Given the
two petitions, Petitioner, like in Schwartz, demonstrated he had the capacity and
resources necessary to assert the claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel without the assistance of an attorney and therefore, has failed to establish why
he waited almost three (3) years to raise this claim. Petitioner has failed to argue, and
support with admissible evidence attached to the petition, why the claims could not be
raised in a reasonable time following the dismissal of the first petition. As such, .this
Court finds the successive petition was not timely filed and therefore, grants the State's
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motion objecting to the successive petition in its entirety. Alternatively, the Court finds
the Petitioner has not established sufficient reason to justify the filing of the successive
petition.
Claim 1: DNA testing
The Petitioner claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
for failing to get the DNA tested and that the claim is properly raised in this successive
petition because it was not fully and fairly litigated in the initial petition. This Court finds
that the substance of this claim was raised in the initial petition, was adjudicated on the
merits and is presently before the Idaho Appellate Courts. If the Appellate Courts find
the post-conviction court erroneously relied on l.C. § 19-4902(b) as opposed to I.C. §
19-4902(a), the appellate courts will remand that issue to the district court Petitioner
asserts as justification for renewing the claim that it was post-conviction counsel who
argued that the testing should be done pursuant to I.C. § 18-4902(b) rather than under
l.C. 19-4902(a). That claim is not supported by the Record, nor is it supported by the
arguments made by Petitioner on that issue in the appellate courts. 2

Initial post-

conviction counsel did not argue to have the testing completed pursuant to l.C. § 194902(b ), but rather, was "relying on the 'generic section for public defenders and
funding."' (Tr., Vol 4, p.1, l.15-p.2, L.6). While initial post-conviction counsel conceded
I.C. § 19-4902 was more specific about DNA testing, counsel clarified that he wanted it
tested and argued the more general section was a basis to test the DNA material. (Tr.,
Vol. 4, p.12, Ls. 5-15).

2

This Court takes judicial notice of the briefs filed on appeal in Jimenez v. State,
Supreme Court Case Number 40109-2012.
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Appellate counsel argued that the 2010 post-conviction petition was timely filed
pursuant to I.C. §19-4902(a) and therefore, Petitioner was not required to meet the l.C.

§ 19-4902(b) standards before getting the testing. Appellate counsel further proffered
that initial post-conviction counsel "correctly argued that the general right to a public
defender provided the district court with authority to order the DNA testing" pursuant to

l.C. §19-4904. (Appellant's Brief, p.4). Thus, Petitioner has failed to show that this claim
was inadequately raised in his initial petition and therefore, has not provided sufficient
grounds to include this claim in his successive petition.
Claim 2 - Machuca Affidavit
This claim is appropriately raised in a successive petition because postconviction counsel did not either include a legally cognizable affidavit or address the
deficiencies in the affidavit such that the issue could be decided on its merits. However,
on this issue, the Court grants the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, as there are
no genuine issues of material fact regarding prejudice, which is discussed below.
Claim 3 - Failure To Challenge The Chain Of Custody Of The Shoes
Petitioner argues that the fact that the claim was not addressed in the first
petition is, in and of itself, grounds to raise the claim in a successive petition. The State
argues that instead, the standard, as set forth in Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635
P.2d 955 (1981 ), requires Petitioner to demonstrate, by admissible evidence, that the
claim was raised in the initial petition, and then deleted from any subsequent Amended
Petitions without Petitioner's knowledge or consent. Otherwise, the State argues, I. C. §
19-4908 has no real meaning because Petitioners could endlessly proffer new, untimely
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claims under the guise that because the claim was not raised, it was necessarily omitted
due to ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel.
I.C. § 19-4908 requires the petitioner to show "sufficient reason" why the claim
was not asserted in the earlier petition. This Court need not analyze what constitutes
sufficient showing because in this case, Petitioner has made no showing at all regarding
the omission of this claim from the original petition.

Instead, he simply points to the

initial petition and argues because the claim was not in the petition, this Court should
speculate the

omission

was the

result of post-conviction

counsel's

deficient

performance. This Court is unwilling to engage in such speculation.
Petitioner, like in Schwartz, demonstrated he had the capacity and resources
necessary to assert various claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
without the assistance of an attorney. He had detailed affidavits, he had a copy of the
letter from the SAPD and raised similar issues in the initial petition. Petitioner has not
offered any reason why he, without the assistance of counsel, was unable to raise this
claim in his initial petition.

The burden is on the Petitioner to show, by admissible

evidence, sufficient reason why the claim was not asserted in the first petition. Asking
the Court to speculate about the reason for the omission does not meet that standard.
Therefore, because Petitioner has not met his burden in justifying the successive
petition on this ground, the State's Motion Objecting to the Successive Petition as to this
ground is granted.
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Motion for Summary Dismissal
DNA claim and Machuca affidavit

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to get the DNA from
the blood on his shoes tested and for interviewing Machuca. Petitioner sought to admit
the content of the Machuca affidavit to support one of Petitioner's primary issues in his
initial post-conviction petition - that the blood on his shoes did not come from Voshall
Thus, the whole purpose for interviewing Machuca would be either to provide a basis to
justify the DNA testing or to refute any inferences that the blood on Petitioner's shoes
came from the Voshall.
This Court would note the content of the affidavit in this petition is identical to the
content of the affidavit in the initial petition, with the exception that the affidavit in this
case is legally cognizable.

However, neither of the Affidavits contain sufficient

foundation for Machuca's conclusion that the blood on Petitioner's shoes belonged to
Machuca rather than someone else. As such, even if the affidavit in the initial petition
had been considered by the district court, the essential piece of information - the source
of the blood - would not have been admissible evidence on which the post-conviction
district court could rely, thereby defeating Petitioner's purpose for introducing the
affidavit.
Petitioner argues that had a legally cognizable affidavit been submitted in his first
post-conviction petition, the affidavit would have been appropriately indicated who the
witness was and the substance of that witness' testimony. This, then, would have
established both the deficient performance by his trial counsel in failing to interview
Machuca and the prejudice suffered by Petitioner. The Court disagrees.
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No foundation has been established for Machuca's ability to opine about the
source of the blood, therefore, he would not have been permitted to testify to that at
trial. Without the conclusion about the source of the blood, Petitioner cannot establish
prejudice - that the outcome of the trial would have been different.
The only admissible portions of the affidavit are:
1. Machuca got into a fight with Petitioner on September 9, 2007;
2. He was not contacted by trial counsel;
3. He agreed to submit to a DNA test regarding the blood samples; and,
4. Had he been contacted, he would have testified he got in a fight with
Petitioner on September 9, 2007.
These statements are insufficient to establish prejudice - i.e., that the outcome of
the trial would have been different. Even if Machuca had been investigated and even if
he would have presented the above testimony at the trial, at best, the testimony would
have allowed defense counsel to argue that perhaps the blood on the shoes came from
Machuca, an argument not dissimilar from the argument he made. There is no
admissible evidence indicating that the outcome of the trial would have been different in
light of the other evidence presented at trial. As such, Petiiioner has not established the
information in the Affidavit could have been considered by the district court in his first
petition or that the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Even if trial counsel had interviewed Machuca, the whole purpose of interviewing
Machuca was to establish the source of the blood on the shoes.

Put another way,

interviewing Machuca could have provided a basis on which to justify the DNA testing.
However, the DNA testing has already been done and while the blood on Petitioner's
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shoes did not come from Voshall, Voshall's blood was found on two different locations
on Petitioner's pants. Thus, all that has changed is the location of the victim's blood on
the Petitioner, not the absence of any the victim's blood on the Petitioner. As such, in
light of the other evidence presented at trial, and given that blood from the victim is
located on the Petitioner, Petitioner has failed to establish by admissible evidence, a
genuine issue of material fact that the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Therefore, the Court grants the State's motion for Summary Judgment on this claims.
Chain of custody of the shoes
Similarly, Petitioner has not established by admissible evidence either deficient
performance for failing to challenge the chain of custody of the shoes nor has he
established prejudice. Petitioner has not alleged or established that had trial counsel
filed a motion to suppress the shoes, he would have been successful. In the absence of
such evidence, Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden of proof and the Court grants
the State's Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue.
In sum, the Court dismissed the Successive Petition because the Court finds that
none of the claims were filed in a reasonable time, that Petitioner has failed to establish
by admissible evidence that the claims were inartfully or inadequately raised in the first
petition or were not waived by failing to raise them in the first petitioner and he has
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact relating to prejudice as to any of his
claims.
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Therefore, the Court grants the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal.

Dated this

s0,- \1i< day of December, 2013.
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The undersigned certifies that on
day o f ~ ' s/he served a true and
correct copy of the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the
manner described:
•

upon counsel for petitioner:
Elizabeth K. Allen
Attorney at Law
PO Box 3842
Nampa, ID 83653

•

upon counsel for respondent:
Jonathan M. Medema
ADA CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. Front Street, Rm 2191
Boise, ID 83702-7709
Juan Jimenez #80739
ICC Max. E2-21 OB
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with
sufficient postage to individuals at the addresses listed above.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO,
Clerk of the Court
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Appendix 8

D.

Jimenez Failed To Present A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him
To An Evidentiary Hearing On Any Of His Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel Claims
Idaho Code§ 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as

tq

each element of petitioner's

claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing
I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court
'

must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110,
112 (2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to
relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to
dismissing the petition.

1st. (citing

Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d

1216, 1220 (1990)).
As is relevant to this appeal, Jimenez's amended petition alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective for: (1) "Refus[ing] to consider DNA test on shoes when

asked by client" (R., Vol. 3, p.362, ,I (9)(b)(viii)); (2) failing to "object to, or
attempt in any way to exclude, blood test evidence" (id., ,i (9)(c)(iii)); (3) failing to
"adequately show the DVDNideo evidence to client before trial" and otherwise
failing to "prepare client for cross-examination" (id., ,i,i (9)(b)(iii) and (9)(c)(ii));
and (4) failing to "request a lesser-included instruction or verdict form for Simple
Battery" (id., ,I (9)(c)(iv)).

To overcome summary dismissal of these claims,

Jimenez was required to demonstrate that "(1) a material issue of fact exist[ed]
as to whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of
fact exist[ed] as to whether the deficiency prejudiced [Jimenez's] case." Baldwin
v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations
omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice).
To establish deficient performance, the burden was on Jimenez "to show
that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was
competent and diligent." !Q.. "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be secondguessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of relevant
evaluation."

k!,_

law,

or other shortcomings

capable of objective

To establish prejudice, Jimenez was required to show "a

reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different." k!,_

Application of the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case
supports the district court's order of summary dismissal; Jimenez failed to
demonstrate from his pleadings and evidence that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to either the deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

1.

Jimenez Failed To Present An Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him
To An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Trial Counsel Was
Ineffective For Not Seeking DNA Testing Of The Blood On
Jimenez's Shoes

Jimenez alleged trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking DNA testing
of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, despite Jimenez's requests that he do so. (R.,
Vol. 3, p.362, ,t9(b)(viii).) In support of this claim, Jimenez asserted he told his
attorney that the blood on his shoes did not belong to the victim, but instead
belonged to Xavier Machuca, an individual with whom Jimenez claimed to have
been in a fight on the same day the victim in this case was stabbed. (R., Vol. 1,
pp.13-14, 53; R., Vol. 3, p.366, ,t9.) According to Jimenez, trial counsel did not
follow up on this information, either by interviewing Machuca or by seeking DNA
testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes. (R., Vol. 3, p.366, ,t,t9, 10.) Jimenez,
however, did not claim he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficiencies.
(See generally, R, Vol. 3, pp.360-68, 439-44.)
The district court summarily dismissed Jimenez's claim that trial counsel
was ineffective for not seeking DNA testing of the blood on Jimenez's shoes,
concluding Jimenez failed to allege facts that, if true, would establish either the
deficient performance or prejudice prongs of his claim. (R., Vol. 3, pp.480-81.)

Specifically, with regard to the alleged deficiency, the court found Jimenez failed
to allege facts to overcome the presumption that trial counsel's decision not to
seek DNA testing to discover the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes was
anything other than sound trial strategy:
It has been this Court's experience that competent defense
counsel does not seek to improve the state's case for the
prosecutor. Rather, defense counsel commonly spend much time
cross-examining the state's witnesses about all of the available
scientific testing and avenues of investigation that the state has not
done or failed to explore; which is what Mr. Porter did in the instant
case.
DNA testing which could exclude [Jimenez as the
perpetrator of the crime] would, of course, be a very appropriate
matter for counsel to explore. That, however, is not the situation in
this case.
(R., Vol. 3, p.481 (emphasis original).) Regarding prejudice, the court "discussed
at length that DNA testing of the blood on the shoes could not exclude [Jimenez]
as being the perpetrator of the crime" (R., Vol. 3, p.480), explaining:
DNA testing has proven to be [a] valuable tool in excluding a
particular person as the perpetrator of an offense in certain
situations. Such testing is often used in sex offense cases and
homicide cases where there is bodily fluid or hair on the body of the
victim or at the scene of the crime. DNA testing can, beyond any
reasonable doubt, exclude a person as being the source of the
bodily fluid or hair. In this case, however, [Jimenez's] argument is
that the blood spots on his shoes belonged to Mr. Machuca with
whom he had been in a fight earlier in the day, prior to the events
resulting in the crime charged in the underlying criminal case. DNA
testing could not exclude [Jimenez] as the perpetrator of the crime
charged. At best, such DNA testing would exclude the victim as
being the source of the blood spots on [Jimenez's] shoes ....
(R., Vol. 3, p.460.) Because the facts alleged by Jimenez, even if true, would not
have demonstrated Jimenez was not the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall, the
court found Jimenez "failed to make a prima facie case that there is a reasonable

probability that the results of DNA testing would have changed the results of the
trial." (R., Vol. 3, pp.459-60.)
Jimenez challenges the district court's ruling, arguing trial counsel had a
duty to investigate the blood evidence relied on by the prosecution and that his
failure to have DNA testing conducted

on the shoes "was objectively

unreasonable" because "it allowed the State to infer that the blood - which in
reality was irrelevant - was a key piece of the circumstantial evidence supporting
Mr. Jimenez's guilt."

(Appellant's brief, p.15.)

He also contends he "was

prejudiced by counsel's failure to request the DNA testing," asserting that, but for
the state's ability in closing argument "to infer Mr. Voshall's blood was on Mr.
Jimenez's shoes, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different."

(Appellant's brief, p.17.)

Neither of Jimenez's

claims have merit.
While it is well settled that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, it is equally well settled
that, "[i]n any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must
be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments,"

&

(emphasis added). "In

assessing the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, [the reviewing court]
consider[s] not only the quantum of evidence known to counsel, but also whether
the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further."
Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146, 139 P.3d 741, 748 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; State v.
Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 307, 986 P.2d 323, 330 (1999)).

Unless counsel's

decision to forego any particular line of investigation is itself based on
"inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation," such decision may not be second-guessed.
Murphy, 143 Idaho at 145-46, 139 P.3d at 747-48; see also Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 690-91 ("strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable").
Jimenez failed in his post-conviction petition and supporting materials to
make a prima facie showing that counsel's decision to forego DNA testing of the
blood on Jimenez's shoes was based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of
the law, or any other objective shortcoming. Nor does he identify any objective
shortcoming on appeal.

(See Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Even accepting as

true Jimenez's assertion that he told trial counsel the blood on his shoes came
from a fight with Mr. Machuca and not from the victim, Jimenez failed to present
any evidence to demonstrate that it was unreasonable not to secure DNA
testing, particularly in light of the other "known evidence" in the case. Murphy,
143 Idaho at 146, 139 P.3d at 748 (citations omitted).
The state's evidence showed only that the blood on Jimenez's shoes was
human blood (Trial Tr., p.423, L.1 - p.426, L.7); the state did not conduct any
DNA testing on the blood and, therefore, could not identify with any degree of
certainty the person to whom the blood belonged (Trial Tr., p.432, L.11 - p.434,
L.15). Although, in hindsight, it appears that DNA testing would have excluded

Mr. Voshall as the source of the blood on the shoes (see Appellant's brief, p.11
n.4 5), it would have at best been a risky proposition for trial counsel to have
sought DNA testing before trial without knowing for certain what the results of
that testing would be. Such risk would not necessarily have been worth taking
because, as explained be the trial court, even if DNA testing could exclude Mr.
Voshall as the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, such would not establish
that Jimenez was not the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall; it would only
establish that Mr. Voshall did not bleed on Jimenez's shoes.

Given the risks

associated with the proposed DNA testing, and considering the de minimus
exculpatory value of even a result excluding Mr. Voshall as the source of the
blood, it was not unreasonable for trial counsel to forego DNA testing and focus
instead on exploiting the weaknesses in the state's case (see Trial Tr., p.432,
L.16 - p.434, L.15 (eliciting from the state's criminalist on cross-examination that
state's test showed stains on shoes and knife were human blood and that,
although such tests were available, state did not perform any tests to determine
whose blood was on shoes and knife); 4/16/08 Tr., p.26, L.1 - p.27, L.1
(emphasizing in closing argument that state could have done DNA testing but did
not and, as such, there was no evidence tying the blood on Jimenez's shoes to
the victim)). See Harrington v. Richter,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 770, 789 (2011)

5

It is telling that Jimenez has apparently never asked for or secured DNA testing
of the blood on the knife. (Compare R., Vol. 3, pp.384-89 (motion and affidavit
requesting DNA testing of shoes and victim's shirt) and Appellant's brief, p.11 n.4
(indicating Jimenez "was able to secure testing of the shoes and Mr. Voshall's
shirt" in a separate criminal action) with (Trial Tr., p.417, L.15 - p.419, L.6 (stains
on knife tested positive for human blood).) Avoiding testing of the knife may also
have played a role in counsel's tactical choice to not seek testing of the shoes.

(internal quotes omitted) ("Rare are the situations in which the wide latitude
counsel must have in making tactical decisions will be limited to any one
technique or approach.").
Even assuming some objective deficiency in trial counsel's failure to seek
DNA testing, Jimenez failed to make a prima facie showing that he was
prejudiced by that decision. As noted above, the district court found Jimenez
was not prejudiced because, even assuming DNA testing would have excluded
the victim as being the source of the blood on Jimenez's shoes, such evidence
would not have excluded Jimenez as being the perpetrator of the crime. (R., Vol.
3, pp.459-60, 480-81.) That the prosecutor was able, in the absence of a DNA
result to the contrary, to rely on the blood stains on Jimenez's shoes as
circumstantial evidence of his guilt does not, as suggested by Jimenez on appeal
(Appellant's brief, p.17), alter the correctness of the district court's ruling.
Jimenez's trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined the state's criminalist
regarding the failure of the state to have conducted DNA testing on the shoes,
despite the availability of such test, and elicited from her unequivocal testimony
that, in the absence of such test, there was no way to tie the blood stains on the
shoes to the victim.
emphasized

these

(Trial Tr., p.430, L.11 - p.434, L.15.)
facts

in

closing

argument,

Counsel also

thereby undercutting the

significance of the evidence and the state's reliance on it. (4/16/08 Tr., p.26, L.1
- p.27, L.1.) These details of the trial go unmentioned by Jimenez on appeal, as
does the fact that the blood on Jimenez's shoes was only one of many pieces of
evidence the state relied on to prove Jimenez was the person who stabbed Mr.

Voshall. Other evidence presented and relied on included: (1) the testimony of
witnesses who saw Jimenez "shove" Mr. Voshall in the abdomen and then,
almost immediately thereafter, heard Mr. Voshall declare he had been stabbed
and saw blood coming from his abdomen (see Trial Tr., p.147, L.16 - p.148,
L.19, p.158, Ls.10-17, p.180, Ls.8-11, p.181, Ls.7-9, p.183, L.17 - p.184, L.13,
p.201, L.8 - p.202, L.21 ); (2) a surveillance video that showed Jimenez "lean in
towards" Mr. Voshall, "almost like he was giving him a one-arm hug" and then
leave the store with one hand in his pocket (see Trial Tr., p.270, Ls.4-9, p.463,
Ls.1-11 ); (3) the same surveillance video that showed Mr. Vos hall double-over
after Jimenez came towards him (see Trial Tr., p.470, L.8 - p.471, L.1 O); (4)
photographs and witness accounts establishing there was blood on the floor very
near the place Jimenez "shoved" Mr. Voshall (see Trial Tr., p.155, Ls.6-13,
p.182, Ls.8-14, p.193, L.16 - p.196, L.2); and (5) a bloody knife recovered from
the route Jimenez and Ruben Nungary took after leaving the store (Trial Tr.,
p.328, L.3 - p.329, L.12, p.362, L.16 - p.367, L.24, p.369, L.15 - p.376, L.22,
p.417, L.15 - p.419, L.6). Given the strength of this evidence, and considering
that even a DNA result excluding Mr. Voshall as the source of blood on
Jimenez's shoes would not have demonstrated Jimenez was not the person who
stabbed him, there is no reasonable possibility that DNA testing, had it been
performed, would have changed the result of the trial.

Jimenez has failed to

establish error in the summary dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.

